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THE  MEMBERS  of the Organization  of Petroleum  Exporting  Countries  have 
developed  a huge  surplus  on goods  and  services  with  the rest  of the  world  as 
a result  of the quadrupling  in oil prices  since  late 1973  and their  inability 
promptly  to spend  on imports  all the subsequent  enlarged  export  receipts.' 
This  surplus,  estimated  at about  $60  billion  in 1974,  can  be reduced  only  by 
the following  means,  alone or in some combination:  (1) a reduction  in oil 
prices;  (2) a reduction  in demand  for OPEC  oil by importing  countries; 
(3) an increase  in imports  of goods and services  by members  of OPEC. 
In spring  1975,  all three  of these  influences  appear  to be at work.  Because 
of reduced  demand  in importing  countries-resulting  from not only the 
price  hike  but also  the  recession  and  from  deliberate  conservation  efforts- 
oil supplies  are piling up, tankers  are idle or are traveling  slowly, and, 
according  to various  reports,  oil sales  are  being  made  on delayed-payment 
arrangements.  From a low base, in 1974 OPEC  imports  expanded  spec- 
tacularly;  the total, including  military  goods, rose about  75 percent,  from 
$22 billion  to about $38 billion. 
For  these  reasons,  some  observers  have  estimated  that  the OPEC  current 
surplus  could  disappear  or shrink  markedly  by the end of the 1970s  or, at 
Note: The views  expressed  are personal  and should not be attributed  to the Board  of 
Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System or other members  of its staff. 
1. For convenience,  the balance on goods, services,  and private  remittances  (surplus 
or deficit)  will be referred  to here as the "current  balance."  The term  "current-account" 
deficit  or surplus  includes  government  grants  paid or received  and, for  the purposes  here, 
this item is a means of financing  the OPEC  surplus  rather  than a flow to be financed. 
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least,  that  the total current  deficit  of the members  of the Organisation  for 
Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  (OECD)  could  disappear  as the 
remaining  deficit  with OPEC  was offset  by a surplus  with the rest of the 
world.2  In my  judgment,  however,  the capacity  of OPEC  countries  to ab- 
sorb  imports  can  be easily  exaggerated,  at least  with  respect  to nonmilitary 
products.  The rate  of growth  in imports  will depend  on the rate  at which 
investment  projects  can  be implemented,  which  in turn  depends  on time  and 
the availability  of skilled  manpower.  Given  these  technological  and physi- 
cal constraints,  this paper  assumes  that the price  elasticity  of OPEC's  de- 
mand  for imports  is very  low. 
Without  deciding  when the OPEC  surplus  will disappear,  I assume  an 
OPEC  current  surplus,  probably  a declining  one, for a number  of years. 
The question  this paper  explores  is how the inevitable  corresponding  cur- 
rent deficit  of the countries  that are not members  of OPEC  should  be di- 
vided  among  them. 
Since  current  deficits  must  be financed,  an alternative  form of the ques- 
tion  is how  the oil-importing  countries  should share  the  increase  in debt  and 
net equity claims against  themselves.3  The OPEC countries  have little 
choice  but to give away,  lend, or invest  the proceeds  of their  current  sur- 
pluses in oil-importing  countries,  which can redirect  such flows among 
themselves  either  by inducing  private  capital  movements  or by official  lend- 
ing and borrowing.  How should  this net flow be apportioned? 
A word  may  be in order  about  the real  effects  of the rise  in oil prices  and 
of changes in current  balances. Although the terms of trade of PICs 
(petroleum-importing  countries)  have deteriorated,  PECs (petroleum-ex- 
porting  countries)  can  spend  only  a limited  amount  of their  enlarged  export 
receipts  and  must  lend  the remainder  back  to PICs.4  As long as they  do so, 
the net worth  of PICs  will  decline  (or rise  less  rapidly)  and  the net worth  of 
PECs will increase,  meaning  under some definitions  a reduction  in real 
income  of the one and  an increase  in real  income  of the other.  But the ab- 
sorption  of resources  by PICs  for domestic  consumption,  investment,  and 
government  outlays  must  fall (or rise less rapidly)  only to the extent that 
2.  OECD Economic  Outlook,  no. 15 (July 1974),  pp. 94-96; Morgan  Guaranty  Trust 
Company  of New York, World  Financial  Markets  (January  21, 1975), p. 8; Edward  R. 
Fried, "Financial  Implications,"  in Joseph A. Yager, Eleanor B. Steinberg,  and asso- 
ciates, Energy  and U.S. Foreign  Policy (Ballinger,  1974). 
3. In the remainder  of the paper, the terms "debt" or "incremental  debt" will be 
taken to include  equity  claims of others  against  the "debtor." 
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their  exports  to PECs  increase.  In the aggregate,  they  need  suffer  no reduc- 
tion in real  absorption  or its rate of growth  apart  from the expansion  of 
exports  to PECs.  They may experience  an unnecessary  reduction  of real 
income-which  is to say,  a recession-if their  domestic  policies  fail to com- 
pensate  for the higher  costs to consumers  of oil products  and the conse- 
quent  curtailment  of spending  on other  goods  and  services,  as they  would  if 
a heavy,  uncompensated  excise  tax on oil had  been  imposed.  In that  event, 
the contraction  of real income  in PICs  would  be a loss of income  to the 
world,  not a transfer  to PECs,  which  can occur  only as the latter  increase 
their  imports  and reduce  their  current  surpluses. 
Relevance  of the Question 
What  is the  rationale  for  this  investigation,  with  its implied  consequences 
for  national  policies  aimed  at apportioning  a given  aggregate  current  deficit 
and accompanying  increase  in debt? 
To start  with, international  economic  relations  have suffered  a sizable 
disturbance  in the form of a quadrupling  of oil prices.  The adjustment  to 
this  disturbance  cannot  be immediate,  given  the physical  limitations  on the 
growth  of imports  by PECs;  and its time pattern,  which  depends  on the 
three  factors  identified  in the opening  paragraph,  is uncertain.  Furthermore, 
the changes  in the structure  of industry  in the PICs  along  the road  to full 
adjustment  are  unpredictable.  Given  these  uncertainties  and  the overriding 
fact that these countries  in the aggregate  cannot eliminate  their current 
deficits  at their  own discretion,  it is vital for them to avoid policies  that 
would  simply  aggravate  one another's  balance-of-payments  problems  with- 
out alleviating  their  aggregate  problem. 
The quadrupling  of oil prices  has thrown  most industrialized  countries 
into a current-balance  position  to which  they  are  unaccustomed.  Since  the 
early  1950s,  most  OECD  countries  have  regarded  a current  surplus  as nor- 
mal  (see  table  1 for the pattern  over  the last fifteen  years).  This  view  made 
economic  sense,  given  the generally  accepted  objective  of transferring  real 
resources  to developing  countries,  financed  by official  and private  capital 
flows.  Beyond  this, a trade  or current-balance  surplus  was frequently  re- 
garded  as a virtue  and  a deficit  was regarded  as a flaw  requiring  corrective 
action.  The  huge  and inevitable  shift  toward  deficit  in current  balances  of 
OECD  countries  can  give  rise  to such  reactions.  Acting  individually,  OECD 64  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
Table  1. Current  Balancesa  of the OECD  Countries,  SeIected  Periods, 
1960-74,  and  Increase  in Cost  of Oil Imports,  1974 
Billions of U.S.  dollars 
Itncrease 
if cost 
Annual average  1965-72  of oil 
imports, 
Country  1960-64  1965-72  High  Low  1973  1974  1974b 
Canada  -0.70  -0.31  0.97  -0.90  -0.50  -1.50  -0.25 
France  0.68  0.25  1.01  -1.46  -0.10  -5.30  6.70 
Germany  1.10  1.98  3.90  -0.65  6.82  11.80  6.90 
Italy  0.24  2.38  3.01  1.28  -1.18  -7.00  5.10 
Japan  -0.34  2.62  6.95  -0.04  0.07  -4.20  12.80 
United Kingdom  0.09  0.95  3.04  -0.26  -2.25  -8.60  6.90 
United States  5.54  1.88  6.37  -5.61  3.36  1.40  16.75 
Other OECD  -0.56  -0.08  4.31  -1.66  5.07  -11.  650  10. 75o 
Total,  OECD  6.05  9.67  13.66  6.98  11.29  -25.05  65.65 
Sources: Organisation  for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Economic Outlook, various 
issues; International Monetary Fund, International  Financial Statistics, various issues; Survey of Current 
Business, vol. 55 (March 1975); OECD, unpublished data; Statistics Canada, Quarterly  Estimates of the 
Canadian  Balance of International  Payments, Fourth Quarter 1974, vol. 22, no.  4 (Ottawa: Information 
Canada, 1975); IMF, unpublished data. Details may not add to totals due to rounding. 
a.  Balance on goods, services, and private remittances. 
b.  Assumes 1973 volume of oil imports at 1974 prices. 
c.  Federal Reserve estimate. 
countries  might  find  it rational  to take  immediate  measures  to restore  their 
traditional  current  surpluses  rather  than incur  debt. Because  such actions 
cannot  possibly  succeed  for OECD  countries  as a group,  the  inevitability  of 
the aggregate  PIC deficit-at least for the time being-needs emphasis. 
Once  the deficit  is accepted,  how it is shared  becomes  a lively  issue. 
Some understanding  about a reasonable  allocation  of the deficit  seems 
necessary  if mutually  frustrating  and destructive  policies  by oil-importing 
countries  are  to be avoided.  As long as an aggregate  OPEC  current  surplus 
exists,  efforts  by any one PIC  to reduce  its current  deficit-by devaluation, 
deflation,  restrictions  on imports,  or export  subsidies-would simply  shift 
the deficit  to another  PIC, unless those efforts  were pinpointed  on the 
country's  current  balance  with  PECs.  The  scope  for such  pinpointed  efforts 
is rather  narrow;  beyond  limitations  on oil imports,  it allows  room  for  little 
else. If a PIC  increased  its exports  to PECs  by subsidies,  for example,  the 
result  would  probably  be to reduce  exports  by other  PICs  to OPEC  (unless 
the subsidy  spurred  an increase  in total OPEC imports),  which would 
merely  shift the aggregate  deficit  rather  than reduce  it. Alternatively,  at- 
tempts  to reduce  the deficit  by devaluation  or deflation  would,  apart  from 
any  resulting  reduction  in oil imports,  also shift  the deficit  to other  PICs  as 
exports  by that  country  to PECs  and  to other  PICs  rose.  Insofar  as devalua- Robert Solomon  65 
tion by PICs  led to substitution  in PECs  of imports  for domestically  pro- 
duced  goods, as could  happen  where  economies  are diversified,  the PECs 
would  probably  either  match  the devaluation  or impose  import  restrictions, 
in light of their  development  aims. 
Thus,  the relevance  of the question  is that focusing  on it will (1) help 
accustom  nations  to inevitable  current  deficits,  which  they tend otherwise 
to regard  as abnormal;  (2) accustom  them to accept  borrowing  in some 
form  as a normal  accompaniment  of current  deficits;  (3) provide  a basis  on 
which oil-importing  countries  can formulate  policies that are mutually 
consistent;  and (4) offer  a way for the rest of the world  to appraise  the 
policies  of individual  countries,  as is done regularly  in the International 
Monetary  Fund, the Organisation  for Economic  Co-operation  and De- 
velopment,  and the Bank  for International  Settlements. 
Although  the problems  this paper  addresses  confront  all oil-importing 
countries,  its analysis  will focus on the OECD.  One  reason  is to make  the 
analysis  manageable.  Another  is that less developed  countries  are in little 
danger  of mutually  frustrating  and destructive  policies  because  they are 
accustomed  to current  deficits.  Still another  is that a substantial  share  of 
OPEC's  surplus  is apt to have its counterpart  in OECD's  deficit.  Finally, 
the OECD  countries,  long before  the autumn  of 1973,  had established  in 
Working  Party  3 the practice  of examining  one another's  current-balance 
positions  and targets  to judge their  compatibility. 
To emphasize  OECD  countries  is not to minimize  the serious  balance-of- 
payments  problems  that many developing  countries  face as a result of 
higher  oil prices  and  that  were  aggravated  in 1974  by recession  in the indus- 
trialized  countries.  The net increase  from 1973  to 1974  in payments  to oil 
producers  by developing  countries  outside  OPEC  is estimated  at $9 billion, 
while "official  development  assistance"  to developing  countries  from the 
countries  on the Development  Assistance  Committee  of the OECD came 
to $9.4 billion  in 1973.5  Even  when  the recession  is over,  LDCs will have 
larger  payments  deficits  than  they did before  1973.  Since  the expansion  of 
OPEC  imports  is likely to be concentrated  in industrial  products,  LDCs 
could  be left with substantial  current  deficits  even  when  OPEC  has moved 
toward  balance  and OECD  has returned  to a surplus  position. 
At the outset,  the OECD  countries  are  far  from  equilibrium.  While  some 
imbalances  always  exist, table 1 demonstrates  that current  balances  were 
5.  World  Bank  Annual  Report,  1974, p. 82. 66  Brookings Papers on Economfc Activity, 1:1975 
much  less  evenly  distributed  in 1974  than  in earlier  years.  In 1974  Germany 
had  a current  surplus  of almost  $12  billion,  while  the OECD  as a whole  had 
a current  deficit  of about  $25  billion.  The  United  States  had  a small  surplus 
and  Japan  a relatively  small  deficit  despite  the huge rise  in their  payments 
for imported  oil in 1974.  These  relatively  strong  current-balance  positions 
had  their  counterparts  in large  deficits  in the United  Kingdom  and  some  of 
the  smaller  OECD  countries,  which  experienced  a reduction  in their  current 
balances  greater  than  the  impact  of higher  oil prices.  Deficits  of non-OECD 
countries  also deepened.  To some  extent  these  imbalances  are  cyclical,  re- 
flecting  the recession  that began  in 1974  in the major  industrial  countries. 
"High  employment"  positions  were  probably  closer  to balance  than  actual 
positions  in 1974.  In any  event,  apart  from  shifts  to achieve  a rational-or 
at least  mutually  acceptable-allocation  of the OECD  deficit,  some  adjust- 
ments  in current  balances  among  OECD  countries  are  called  for and  prob- 
ably will occur. 
Identification  of Bases  for Allocation 
The  problem  that  confronts  OECD  can  be framed  in terms  of the alloca- 
tion among  these  countries  either  of current  deficits  or of incremental  debt. 
For any  individual  OECD  country  and  for  the  group,  the  current  deficit  will 
equal  the increase  in debt over  any time period.  On the historic  evidence, 
OECD  countries  can be expected  to avoid  heavy  use of their  international 
reserves  to finance  current  deficits.  Furthermore,  their current  deficit  is 
likely  to consist  of a current  surplus  with  the rest  of the world  (the  develop- 
ing countries,  Eastern  Europe,  Russia,  and China)  and a more than off- 
setting  current  deficit  with OPEC.  Similarly,  OECD will be a net capital 
importer  over  the next  few years,  because  net capital  inflows  from OPEC 
will outstrip  net capital  outflows  to the rest of the world. 
Whether  the  focus  is on incremental  debt  or on the  current  deficit,  exam- 
ining the criteria  for optimal  allocation  is important.  The criteria  for the 
two approaches  may well overlap.  Emphasis  on current  deficits  involves 
questions  about  absorption  of resources  and its pattern  over  time,  and  the 
allocation  of resources  within  individual  countries  during  and  after  the ad- 
justment period. Focus on incremental  debt raises questions  of credit- 
worthiness,  ability  to borrow,  and the availability  of official  financing  to 
supplement  private  capital  flows  (including  arrangements  to reshuffle  capi- 
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Agreement  on a pattern  of current  deficits  and  incremental  debts  among 
OECD  countries  implies  adopting  policy  measures  to achieve  that  pattern. 
The policy instruments  available  for adjusting  current  balances  include 
government  borrowing  from  abroad  (in money  and capital  markets,  from 
other  governments,  or  from  international  institutions),  which  has  become  a 
major  policy  instrument  and  which  clearly  affects  exchange  rates;  differen- 
tial demand-management  policies  among  countries;  changes  in the fiscal- 
monetary  policy  mix that will affect  private  capital  flows and hence ex- 
change  rates;  and  direct  intervention  in exchange  markets  by central  banks. 
The general  desire  to avoid trade restrictions  and export subsidies  was 
reflected  in a "trade  pledge"  adopted by OECD in 1974 and renewed 
May  29, 1975,  for another  year  by all members  except  Portugal.6 
DO NOTHING-JUST  STAND  THERE 
Suppose  for the moment  that the OECD countries  do not agree on a 
division  of the deficit.  What  would  happen  if they followed  a laissez-faire 
prescription?  Assume  no official  intervention  in exchange  markets  and no 
governmental  borrowing  or other direct  attempts  (including  controls)  to 
influence  capital  or trade  flows in any OECD country.  For the area as a 
whole, the current  deficit  and the capital  inflow vis-h-vis  OPEC  will be 
roughly  equal,  while,  with the rest of the world,  OECD will presumably 
have  a current  surplus  financed  by official  bilateral  and  multilateral  develop- 
ment assistance  and by private  capital  flows to LDCs outside  of OPEC. 
This "do-nothing"  case differs  from the general  case for freely  floating 
exchange  rates  because  neither  the OECD  current  deficit  with OPEC  nor 
the net capital  flow  from OPEC  to OECD  will be significantly  affected  by 
the exchange  rate  between  the two groups.  The rate at which  the current 
surplus  of the OPEC  countries  can  be compressed  is limited  by their  ability 
to absorb  imports.  Given the economic  characteristics  of these countries, 
the  price  elasticity  of their  aggregate  demand  for imports  must  be very  low 
and  therefore  devaluation  of OECD  currencies  relative  to OPEC  currencies 
would  do little, if anything,  to curtail  the OPEC  surplus.  And, since the 
major  capital  and  money  markets  are  in OECD  countries,  OPEC  members 
have  little  choice  but  to invest  their  surpluses  somewhere  in OECD,  regard- 
less of exchange  rates. 
The broad  case for the laissez-faire  approach  relies  on the usual argu- 
6. International  Monetary  Fund, IMF Survey,  vol. 4 (June  9, 1975), pp. 161, 165. 68  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
ments for free-market  solutions. Furthermore,  if  governments  eschew 
specific  aims  for the current  account,  they cannot  possibly  pursue  incom- 
patible  targets  or beggar-thy-neighbor  policies. 
Under  the  laissez-faire  assumptions,  any  OECD  country  will  have,  in the 
initial  period,  a given  current  balance,  inflow  of OPEC  funds,  and  flow of 
capital  to or from  the rest  of the world.  If these  three  flows  sum  to zero at 
the  existing  exchange  rate,  that  country's  situation  would  be stable.  For the 
"representative"  OECD  country,  the current  balance  will  be in deficit.  The 
magnitude  of capital  inflow  directly  from  OPEC  will  depend  on the oppor- 
tunities  for direct  investment  as perceived  by OPEC  investors,  on the avail- 
ability of and yield on money- and capital-market  instruments,  on the 
expectations  of OPEC  financial  managers  regarding  movements  in the ex- 
change  rate  of the  country,  and  possibly  on political  considerations.  Capital 
flows  to or  from  other  countries  and  the  Eurocurrency  markets-funds  that 
originally  might  have come from OPEC-will also depend  on relative  in- 
terest  rates  and  expectations  about  the  exchange  rate;  such  flows  could  arise 
at the initiative  of foreigners  or of residents  of the country,  but by defini- 
tion of the laissez-faire  case, deliberate  borrowing  by the government  to 
finance  the current  deficit  is ruled  out. 
OECD countries  differ  significantly  in the breadth  and depth of their 
money and capital  markets.  Countries  in which  the markets  are not well 
developed-in the sense  that  the annual  total  of net new  issues  of securities, 
short-  and  long-term,  is small  and  market  turnover  is low-are  unlikely  to 
attract  OPEC  funds directly  even if current  market  yields are relatively 
favorable;  nor are  they  likely  to attract  funds  from  other  OECD  countries 
except  to the extent  that their own citizens  take the initiative  to borrow 
when  interest  rates  are  lower  in other  financial  markets  or  the  Euromarkets. 
A country  (call  it country  A) in this  position  is likely  to experience  a capital 
inflow smaller  than its initial current  deficit,  and its exchange  rate will 
therefore  tend to fall. Under  the assumptions  here,  the exchange  rate  will 
fall until  the current  deficit  is reduced  to the amount  of net capital  inflow. 
Trade  and invisible  transactions  respond  only with a lag to changes  in 
exchange  rates.7  While  economists  may disagree  about  the length  of these 
lags, for present  purposes  all that matters  is that some lags exist.  Yet the 
exchange  market  in country  A has  to clear  daily  without  intervention,  under 
7. See, for example,  Helen  B. Junz  and Rudolf  R. Rhomberg,  "Price  Competitiveness 
in Export Trade Among Industrial  Countries,"  American  Economic  Review, vol. 63 
(May 1973),  pp. 412-18, Robert Solomon  69 
the assumed  laissez-faire  conditions.  The  exchange  rate  might  have  to over- 
shoot  the equilibrium  level  in the meantime-to a point at which  investors 
(or speculators),  inside  or outside  country  A, perceive  that it has done so 
and move capital  in to profit  from  the expected  reversal  in its movement. 
The decline  in the exchange  rate,  while  it has a lagged  effect  on the vol- 
ume  of trade,  will  have  a prompt  effect  on import  prices  and on the general 
price  level,  with  a possible  lagged  effect  on wages.  The  change  in the  current 
balance  may also have income  effects,  but these  presumably  are offset  by 
fiscal  and monetary  policies.  At some exchange  rate and with some cost- 
push  inflation  owing  to the initial  rise  in import  prices,  after  a lag, capital 
inflows  into  country  A will  equal  the  current  deficit  without  further  changes 
in exchange  rates  or other  policy  actions.  In this  process  of accommodation 
the exchange  rate will at some stage tend to rise if there  has been earlier 
overshooting,  thereby  reducing  the price of imports.  Whether  any of the 
earlier  upward  movement  of prices  and  wages  will  be reversed  is question- 
able  in today's  world. 
Meanwhile,  country  B will receive  capital  in excess  of its current  deficit, 
given  the assumption  that  total  capital  flow  from  OPEC  to OECD  roughly 
equals  OPEC's  current  surplus  with  OECD.  Country  B's  currency  will  tend 
to appreciate,  as it would,  in any event,  as a reflection  of the depreciation 
of A's currency.  The extent of the more general  appreciation  of B's ex- 
change  rate  will depend  on the size of its capital  inflows  relative  to its ex 
ante current  deficit.  Again overshooting  may occur,  which  will lower  B's 
import  prices.  In time  B's current  deficit  will  rise  and  its capital  inflow  may 
fall  as a result  of market  expectations  that  the  appreciation  in its currency  is 
likely  to be reversed.  Insofar  as B's  lower  import  prices  percolate  through  to 
its price-wage  level,  the deterioration  of its current  balance  will  be less  than 
would  be expected  from the movement  in its exchange  rate  alone. 
The laissez-faire  case ultimately  generates  a pattern  of current  deficits 
and  capital  flows  that  may  or may  not be stable.  If the  (lagged)  reduction  in 
A's current  deficit  resulting  from the depreciation  of its currency  is fully 
reflected  in an  increase  in B's deficit,  all will  be well.  But  perhaps  A's deficit 
will  decline  at the  expense  of country  C, which  is not attracting  an excess  of 
capital  from abroad.  In that case, C's exchange  rate will fall and it will 
share  A's experience.  The  result  could  be a round  of devaluations  of OECD 
currencies  that  would  be fruitless,  since  they  would  not reduce  the  aggregate 
deficit  of oil-importing  countries. 
Furthermore,  the price  increase  set off in A by the initially  excessive  de- 70  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
valuation  may, depending  on the organization  of its labor  market  among 
other  things,  acquire  a momentum  of its own, and  push  the exchange  rate 
further  downward.  In the  end,  country  A will  have  a relatively  small  share  of 
the  OECD  deficit  (a "non-oil"  surplus).  If it should  turn  out that,  as OPEC 
imports  rise over  the next five years,  country  A's comparative  advantage 
makes  it a prime  supplier  to OPEC  countries,  its current  surplus  will  be too 
large and its currency  will have to appreciate.  The resource-allocation 
effects  of first  devaluing  because  of inadequate  capital  inflow  (in the ab- 
sence  of deliberate  governmental  borrowing)  and later revaluing  may be 
costly. 
Another  instability  would  arise  if the capital  flow  that  country  A attracts 
when  the  market  decides  its exchange  rate  has  touched  bottom  comes  from 
country  D, which,  up to this point, has had a stable  exchange  rate  with a 
current  deficit  just balanced  by capital inflows. Country  D's currency 
would  depreciate  and it would  begin  to repeat  A's experience. 
Judgments  on the laissez-faire  case before  examining  the other  options 
may  be premature.  Granting  this, the major  shortcomings  are  the possible 
price-wage  and resource-allocation  effects  during  and after the period  of 
adjustment  for the balance  of payments.  In any event, governments  are 
quite  likely  to find  the laissez-faire  approach  unacceptable.  And govern- 
ments  patently  are  borrowing  to finance  current  deficits.  If they  are  going  to 
take  a hand  in managing  their  balance-of-payments  positions,  good sense 
dictates  attempts  to establish  compatible  goals. 
The  alternatives  to the  laissez-faire  case  involve,  first,  target  setting-per- 
haps  zones  rather  than  points-for current  deficits  by the OECD  countries; 
second,  deliberate  governmental  actions  to supplement  private  capital  flows 
so as to provide  a total  capital  inflow  equal  to the target  deficit;  and,  third, 
use of other  policy instruments,  including  intervention  in the foreign-ex- 
change  markets,  to prevent  the temporary  overshooting  described  in the 
examples  above. 
Adoption  of targets  and of policies  to achieve  them  assumes  that  govern- 
ments  have the foresight  and ability  to manage  their  payments  positions 
more  effectively  and acceptably  than would  the free play of markets.  This 
is a controversial  assumption,  without  doubt. 
On  what  criteria  might  targets  for  the  current  balance  or  incremental  debt 
be established?  The standards  for judging  a proposed  basis  for allocating 
the  OECD  deficit  or incremental  debt  are  (1) the differential  impact  among Robert  Solomon  71 
countries  on present  as against  future  "absorption"  of resources  for domes- 
tic use; (2)  the  extent  to which  reallocations  of resources  can be minimized 
during  and  after  the adjustment  period,  on the assumption  that the OPEC 
surplus  is temporary;  (3) the willingness  and ability  of countries  to incur 
incremental  debt  and  the corresponding  willingness  of OECD  countries  in 
overall  surplus  to lend to the others;  and (4) the effect  on the longer-run 
rate  of growth  of real  income  in the OECD countries. 
The  Do-Something  Case 
This  section  abandons  the "do-nothing"  case  so far  as to assume  a desire 
of OECD  governments  to consult  about an allocation  of their combined 
deficit  and to take policy  measures  aimed  at realizing  the agreed  pattern. 
During  this  process,  the  OECD  combined  deficit  may  be shrinking  as OPEC 
imports  increase.  According  to what criteria  might the OECD countries 
allocate  the overall  current  deficit?  The following sections set forth six 
possible  candidates  and examine  their  merits  and demerits. 
ABILITY TO REDUCE  ABSORPTION  OF RESOURCES 
Since  a larger  deficit  means  a greater  capacity  to use  resources  for domes- 
tic purposes,  welfare  considerations  might  suggest  apportioning  the aggre- 
gate OECD  deficit  so that the poorer  countries  have the larger  shares.  In 
other  words,  the transfer  of real  resources  abroad  to pay for higher-priced 
oil would  be delayed  for the poorer  countries  until growth  of their  econ- 
omies  made  it less  burdensome.  One  way  of applying  this  criterion  would  be 
to allocate  the OECD  current  deficit  in inverse  proportion  to gross  national 
product  (or gross  domestic  product)  per capita.  For example,  this system 
would call for the assignment  of relatively  small current  deficits  to the 
United  States  and Germany  and relatively  large  ones to Spain  and Italy. 
To avoid  assigning  unreasonably  large  deficits  to very  small  countries,  the 
results  must  be scaled  by some  measure  of size;  table  2 gives  the results  of 
using  total  population  for this purpose. 
It is useful  to consider  this criterion  first  because  it clearly  reveals  the 
tradeoff  between  parting  with  real  resources  and taking  on debt.  The pref- 
erence  functions  of countries  in this respect  are not clear,  but the danger 
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less effort  to reduce  their own individual  current  deficits  implies  that at 
least some countries  are more willing  to give up resources  than to incur 
debt.8 
Whatever  the  pattern  of preferences,  allocating  incremental  debts  on this 
basis  might  be difficult.  Ex ante  capital  flows  would  be unlikely  to conform 
to the pattern  that  was  generated  by this criterion;  that  is, OPEC  capital  is 
more  likely  to go to the countries  with higher  incomes  per capita,  which 
happen  to be the countries  with better-developed  capital markets.  As 
column  (1) of table 2 shows,  almost  one-third  of the deficit  would  be as- 
signed  to the smaller  OECD  countries,  which  account  for only 14 percent 
of the  gross  domestic  product  of all OECD  countries.  Thus,  a heavy  volume 
of compensatory  official  capital  flows  would  be necessary;  specifically,  since 
the  richer  countries  would  probably  be net recipients  of capital  in excess  of 
their  relatively  small  assigned  current  deficits,  they would  have to be pre- 
pared  to lend,  directly  or indirectly,  to the poorer  industrial  countries.  It is 
a reasonable  prediction  that the willingness  of OECD  countries  to provide 
official  financing  to one another  has limits. 
Another  objection  to this approach  is the possible  positive  correlation 
between  GNP per capita  and comparative  advantage  in meeting  OPEC's 
expanding  demand  for imports. In fact, the exchange-rate  movements 
necessary  to achieve  the pattern  of current  deficits  called for by this cri- 
terion-depreciation  of the currencies  of richer  OECD  countries  relative  to 
those  of the poorer  ones-would strengthen  the comparative  advantage  of 
the richer  countries.  Thus,  when  the OECD  deficit  disappears  in the 1980s, 
the richer  countries  might  be in excessive  current  surplus  and the balance- 
of-payments  adjustments  needed  at that time could well involve  costly  re- 
allocations  of resources. 
ECONOMIC SIZE 
Some  variant  of GNP-that  is, a criterion  reflecting  economic  size-has 
the  merit  of assigning  current  deficits  in apparent  conformity  with  ability  to 
incur  debt  and  with  the likely  pattern  of capital  flows.  By this criterion,  the 
United  States  and  Germany,  for  example,  would  take on a relatively  larger 
8. In an interview  reported  in Business  Week  (October 12, 1974), pp. 40-42, Guido 
Carli,  Governor  of the Bank of Italy, proposed  a scheme  that suggested  the readiness  of 
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Table  2. Allocation  of Assumed  OECD  Current  Deficit  of $30 Billion 
According  to Selected  Criteria,  and  Adjusted  Normal  Surplus,  by Country 
Billions  of U.S. dollars 
Deficit  per 
capita  inversely  Deficit  Deficit  Normal 
proportional  to  proportional  proportional  surplus  plus 
GDP  per  to  to  "oil deficit" 
Country  capitaa  GDPa  populationa  in 1974b 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Canada  0.6  1.1  0.9  -0.5 
France  1.7  2.4  2.1  5.1 
Germany  1.8  3.2  2.5  3.7 
Italy  3.5  1.3  2.2  3.5 
Japan  4.6  3.8  4.4  8.2 
United Kingdom  2.9  1.6  2.3  4.7 
United States  5.4  12.2  8.6  6.7 
Other  OECD  9.5  4.3  6.9  9.1 
Total, OECD  30.0  30.0  30.0  40.5 
Sources: Computed from OECD,  Main Econonmic  Indicators (December 1974), and OECD Economic 
Outlook,  no. 10 (December 1971); table 1 above; and Federal Reserve staff estimates. The figures may not 
add to totals due to rounding. 
a. Assumes total OECD current deficit of $30 billion; based on gross domestic product and population 
in 1973.  In column (1) the deficit  is distributed  inversely  to GDP and then scaled to the size of the population. 
b. The oil deficit is defined as the increase from 1973 to 1974 in payments for imported oil minus the in- 
crease in exports to the OPEC countries. The minus sign denotes a surplus. 
share of the total debt, and Italy and Denmark would take less while also 
having smaller targets for current deficits. 
Under this approach countries would share the initial deficit in propor- 
tion to their economic size. Moreover, as OPEC imports rise and the OPEC 
current  surplus shrinks, countries could also share equitably the impact of 
the real transfer  to OPEC (the loss of "absorption" for OECD as a whole). 
But, since real income per capita differs among OECD countries, a strict 
proportionality  of current deficits to GNP in some cases would initially im- 
pose a somewhat greater relative real transfer on poorer countries than on 
the rich. To avoid this result, total population or total labor force, rather 
than real GNP, could be used as the measure of economic size.9 
A possible objection to  allocating current deficits in proportion to GNP 
or economic size stems from the wide differences among OECD countries 
in the share in GNP of foreign trade. With its big GNP and small foreign 
sector, the United States would be assigned a current deficit that appeared 
9. In fact, however,  this problem  has not deterred  the Development  Assistance  Com- 
mittee of OECD from assigning  targets  for development  assistance  as a proportion  of 
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very large in relation to its normal exports while the Netherlands would be 
in the opposite position. The GDP of the United States is 41 percent of the 
OECD total, while that of the Netherlands is 1.8 percent. Thus, of a current 
OECD deficit of about $30 billion, the U.S. share would be $12 billion and 
the Dutch share $540 million. Yet U.S. exports were less than three times 
Dutch exports in 1973 ($71 billion versus $24 billion). Thus, the current 
deficit assigned to the United  States would equal about one-sixth of its 
annual exports while the deficit assigned to the Netherlands would come to 
less than 3 percent of its exports. Germany's assigned share of the OECD 
deficit  would equal $3.2 billion, about 5 percent of its 1973 level of exports 
of $68 billion. Assignment on the basis of GNP thus could create problems 
for balance-of-payments adjustment in  the  future. On  the  other hand, 
growth of  OPEC demand for imports (and the  induced effects of  this 
growth on other countries' imports) may also be distributed among OECD 
countries roughly in proportion to their GNP, as discussed above. In that 
event, this criterion  would have considerable merit. Furthermore, distribu- 
tion on the basis of population, rather than GNP, would lessen this prob- 
lem, as table 2 demonstrates. 
RATE  OF  RETURN  ON  CAPITAL 
Since, for any OECD country, current deficits represent additional real 
resources  for home use relative to what would otherwise be available, con- 
sideration  might be given to allocating the aggregate OECD deficit accord- 
ing to the social rate of return on additional resources. This criterion has 
particular  appeal if a country with a relatively large current deficit is ex- 
pected to undertake more investment than a country with a smaller one. 
Some urge it as the most rational way to use the increase in world saving 
that OPEC is lending back to the rest of the world.10 On these various 
grounds this criterion would tend to maximize real GNP  growth in the 
OECD area as a whole. Furthermore,  it would allocate incremental debt to 
countries in proportion to their potential for growth. 
An objection to this criterion would be the inconsistency of its sudden 
application at the margin. In the past, the appropriateness of current sur- 
10. See W. M. Corden  and Peter Oppenheimer,  "Basic Implications  of the Rise in 
Oil Prices,"  Moorgate  and Wall  Street (Autumn 1974),  pp. 23-38 (published  in London 
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pluses was  judged not in the light of the rate of return  but rather in the light 
of  the capacity and assumed obligation  of  countries to  export capital, 
particularly  to developing nations. 
A more elementary and possibly fatal objection to this criterion is the 
difficulty  of estimating national rates of return on investment in a way that 
is generally accepted. I pretend to no expertise in capital theory. If this 
general criterion-the  marginal rate of social return on investment-has 
appeal, I would propose that OECD  form a working party to  develop 
acceptable  measures or proxies for it."1 
POTENTIAL FOR PRODUCING  SUBSTITUTES  FOR OPEC OIL 
If the OECD makes a concerted effort to reduce its dependence on OPEC 
oil by developing substitute sources of energy, that endeavor will require 
considerable  investment outlays in some countries. OECD countries differ 
in potential for this endeavor. The United States has enormous coal re- 
serves, whereas Japan has limited possibilities of producing oil substitutes. 
The higher oil price is swelling potential world saving; and this shift is now 
contributing  to recession since no commensurate increase in consumption 
or investment or government spending has yet accompanied the conse- 
quent OPEC lending to  the OECD  area. Insofar as investment in sub- 
stitutes for OPEC oil will be substantial, and will thus raise the share of 
total investment in GNP,  a case can be made for allocating the OECD 
current deficit more heavily to countries that make this heavier additional 
investment. 
This approach would allocate a very large share of the OECD deficit to 
the United States, with the result that other OECD countries would give up 
real resources  earlier. But U.S. consumption of oil is generally regarded as 
wasteful  and more susceptible to conservation than that of other countries. 
Thus, the United States could, without undue strain, reduce its oil con- 
sumption in order to provide scope for more investment in energy without, 
in effect, absorbing resources from other OECD countries. 
A decisive objection to this approach may be its penalties on a country 
with little potential for oil substitutes but a high rate of return on other in- 
11. Two of the members  of the working  party should be Robert M. Solow and Ed- 
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vestment.  If such  a country  were  assigned  a larger  current  deficit  and  carried 
out normal  investments,  its income growth  could be rapid enough ulti- 
mately  to reduce  the relative  burden  of higher  oil costs. 
NORMAL CURRENT  SURPLUSES  ADJUSTED  FOR OIL DEFICITS 
Before  oil prices  were  raised,  a broad  consensus  existed  in OECD  on the 
appropriate  pattern  of cyclically  adjusted  current  surpluses  (referred  to here 
as "normal"  surpluses).  This consensus  was strengthened  by the consider- 
able work  and debate  in the four months  between  the suspension  of con- 
vertibility  of the dollar  into gold on August  15, 1971,  and the Smithsonian 
Agreement  on December  18. 
One  way  of allocating  the deficit  would  be to adjust  each country's  nor- 
mal surplus  for its "oil deficit"-assuming  agreement  on the definition  of 
that  component  and on measurement  of changes  in it. The most common 
definition  of an oil deficit  is the increase  from  some  base  date  in a country's 
payments  for imported  oil minus the increase  in its exports to OPEC 
members. 
In 1970,  the OECD  current  surplus  with the rest of the world  was esti- 
mated  at $10.4  billion  on a cyclically  adjusted  basis,  reflecting  an average 
annual  increase  of about $400 million since 1960.  In 1972  the minimum 
norm  for the United  States  was thought  to be about $6 billion,  leaving  $5 
billion  for the rest of OECD.12  For 1974,  in the absence  of the rise in oil 
prices,  the normal  OECD surplus  would  be about $12 billion. 
Adjusting  such normal surpluses  for oil deficits  involves conceptual 
problems,  which become ever more difficult  with time.'3 For example, 
should  the oil deficit  include  oil trade  between  Canada  and  Norway,  which 
are  oil exporters,  and  other  OECD  countries?  Should  interest  and  dividends 
paid  by OECD  to OPEC  members  be included  in the computation?  What 
about  the  effects  on other  elements  of OECD  trade  caused  by the change  in 
relative  prices  and  by the financial  transfers  from OPEC  to other  develop- 
ing countries?  How many of these influences  on OECD current  balances 
should  one take  into account  in computing  an oil deficit? 
Ignoring  them  all,  one  could  get a rough  measure  of the  impact  by adjust- 
ing each country's  normal  current  surplus  for the increase  in its actual  oil 
12. OECD Economic  Outlook,  no. 10 (December  1971), pp. 8, 10, 11. 
13. These problems  are set forth in OECD Economic  Outlook,  no. 16 (December 
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imports  from 1973  minus  the increase  in its exports  to OPEC countries 
from 1973.  For the United  States  these  magnitudes  were about $17  billion 
and $3 billion,  respectively,  in 1974,  netting  to about $14  billion.  The U.S. 
target  for the current  deficit  for 1974  would  have  been a little  less than $7 
billion on this basis, compared  with an actual current  surplus  of $1.4 
billion.  Japan's  normal  current  balance  would  have  required  an adjustment 
of about $101/4  billion in 1974 (a $123/4  billion increase  in oil spending 
minus  increased  exports  to OPEC  of $21/2  billion).  Assuming  its normal 
surplus  was $2 billion, its target deficit would be just over $8 billion, 
whereas  its actual  current  deficit  was $4.2  billion.  For Germany  the target 
deficit  would  have  been nearly  $4 billion,  compared  with  an actual  current 
surplus  of $11.8  billion.  As is evident  in table 2, I have not attempted  to 
"normalize"  the individual  deficits  to match the total of $30 billion as- 
sumed  for the other  allocations. 
This  approach  would  invoke  the objection  that normal  deficits  would  be 
awarded  inversely  with efforts  at conservation:  a country  that reduced  its 
oil imports  would be assigned  a smaller  normal  deficit.  Thus, the more 
"virtuous"  countries  would be expected  to make earlier  real transfers  to 
OPEC  than  the "wastrels."  On the other  hand,  since  the latter  would  take 
on a larger  share  of the total OECD  debt,  this objection  is not necessarily 
decisive.  Furthermore,  this problem  might be avoided  by basing the oil 
deficit  on the physical  quantity  of each  country's  imports  in a base  year- 
say, 1973-rather than on actual  imports. 
Another  objection  to this approach  might be that, in the short  run, it 
implies  that the increase  in the OPEC  surplus  is an aberration  whose  im- 
pact  countries  should  accept.  But it has the advantage  of adjusting  targets 
for increases  in exports  to OPEC  as the OECD  deficit  shrinks.  In this way 
it looks to the ultimate  adjustments  in "normal"  current  balances  that 
might  be necessary  and that will almost inevitably  differ  among OECD 
countries.  Countries  that captured  a larger  share of the growing  OPEC 
market  would  over  time  be assigned  targets  involving  smaller  current  defi- 
cits.  Whether  the final  pattern  of current  balances  would  appear  acceptable 
is not clear. 
POTENTIAL EXPORTS TO OPEC 
The  expected  distribution  among  OECD  countries  of increases  in exports 
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focus  because  the  predominant  adjustment  in world  trade  over  the next  de- 
cade will reflect  the growth  of its imports.  This approach  is circular,  of 
course,  since  it requires  assumptions  about  relative  exchange  rates  among 
OECD  countries.  But  that  objection  aside,  the  virtue  of this  criterion  is that 
it minimizes  the resource  reallocation  in individual  OECD  countries  after 
the transition  from  the present  large  OECD  deficit  to a normal  surplus  in 
the 1980s.  Like the previous  criterion,  it provides  for a gradual  move to 
equilibrium  as OPEC  imports  grow, instead  of requiring  some countries 
first  to concentrate  resources  on exports  and then to reverse  this process 
once OECD  as a whole  has completed  the adjustment. 
The  problem  here  is the  difficulty  in predicting  potential  exports  to OPEC 
by individual  OECD  countries  even on the assumption  of fixed  exchange 
rates.  In practice,  this  approach  might  well  resolve  into a negotiation  about 
sharing  the growing  OPEC markets,  the results of which would guide 
exchange-rate  policies.  Such  a result  might  be rigid  and the agreed  distri- 
bution of current  deficits  might be economically  unjustified.  This dis- 
advantage  must  be set against  the apparent  minimization  of resource  re- 
allocation  during  the transitional  period. 
Concluding  Observations 
This  paper  is a preliminary  exploration  and yields  no clear-cut  and un- 
equivocal  conclusions.  For one thing,  it neglects  the possibility  of an inter- 
mediate  case between  complete  laissez-faire  and systematic  assignment  of 
current-balance  targets.  The  objective  is to prevent  the  adoption  of mutually 
self-defeating  domestic  or external  policies  that  could  cause  wasteful  losses 
of income,  internal  instability  of prices  and wages,  excessive  reallocations 
of resources,  and restrictions  on trade  and payments.  In the intermediate 
case  envisaged  here,  the OECD  countries  would  renew  the pledge  against 
trade  restrictions  that  they  adopted  in 1974.  If their  currencies  were  floating, 
they  would  abide  by the  IMF guidelines,  which  among  other  things  rule  out 
the equivalent  of competitive  devaluations  (by proscribing  "aggressive 
intervention"  and other  policies  that would further  depress  an exchange 
rate that was already  falling).14  This stance still leaves countries  free to 
borrow  externally  and to intervene  in exchange  markets  to prevent  their 
14. International  Monetary  Fund, International  Monetary  Reform:  Documents  of the 
Committee  of Twenty  (IMF, 1974),  p. 35. Robert  Solomon  79 
rates from rising or falling. Implicitly, therefore, countries would be pursu- 
ing current-balance  aims. The IMF and the OECD could monitor national 
policies and their consequences for the balance of payments, and, when ap- 
parent incompatibilities  arose, could urge countries to alter their policies. 
In this process the IMF and OECD would be concerned with the implica- 
tions not only for OECD countries but for the rest of the world. Whether 
this ex post approach is preferable to an explicit and systematic ex ante 
effort to establish balance-of-payments targets is left to the reader. 
To sum up briefly, the laissez-faire case will appeal to many economists. 
The arguments against it-apart  from the fact that, rightly or wrongly, 
governments  are not accepting it-are  that it might spur a series of fruitless 
devaluations  and in the process aggravate price-wage instability and that it 
might induce more resource reallocation than is necessary to cope with the 
temporary OPEC surplus. 
If governments are to manage their deficits-as  they have done during 
1974 and 1975  by deliberately  borrowing and intervening in exchange mar- 
kets-it  is important that their balance-of-payments aims be compatible 
and of a magnitude that can be financed. 
This paper  has examined six criteria  according to which the OECD coun- 
tries  might establish consistent aims for current  deficits and the correspond- 
ing incremental  debt over the next few years. Of these, two-those  relying 
on ability to reduce absorption of resources and on potential for substitu- 
tion for petroleum-encounter  decisive objections. Two-economic  size 
and normal surpluses adjusted for "oil deficits" as defined above-merit 
further consideration. And  two-the  rate of  return on  investment and 
potential exports to OPEC-might  degenerate into a negotiation. But ad- 
herence to a set of negotiated aims would be preferable  to active pursuit of 
incompatible aims. Comments  and 
Discussion 
Marina  v. N. Whitman:  I found  Solomon's  paper  an interesting  attempt  to 
set up  criteria  for allocating  the oil deficit.  For the purposes  of discussion,  I 
can  accept  his fundamental  assumptions  that  the OPEC  countries  will have 
a surplus  over  a considerable  time, and that the cartel  will not crack  and 
return  the  world  to the status  quo ante.  I also accept  as given  that countries 
will  insist  on setting  current-account  targets,  whether  they ought to or not, 
and  that  an attempt  should  be made  to coordinate  these  targets.  The heavy 
management  of the current  floating  rates  suggests  that  the dangers  of com- 
petitive  depreciation  and the like are quite real. An allocation  of the oil 
deficit  is a natural  outgrowth  of the efforts  of Working  Party  3 to coordi- 
nate  current-account  targets  among  the OECD  countries,  a general  attempt 
to assure  consistent  aims  that has been under  way for several  years. 
The  central  issues  in Solomon's  paper  concern  the problems  of avoiding 
inconsistencies  in international  allocation  schemes-issues that extend  far 
beyond  oil. The paper  is really  an argument  about balance-of-payments 
adjustment  and, more specifically,  a brief in favor of some fixity of ex- 
change  rates.  Solomon's  paper  contains  strong  echoes  of Ragnar  Nurkse's 
arguments  of the late 1940s  against  so-called  unnecessary  reallocations  of 
resources  caused  by exchange-rate  fluctuations.  This is one aspect of a 
fundamental  controversy  about  the economic  costs associated  with  rigidity 
and  nonadaptation,  on the one hand,  and  the adjustment  costs of realloca- 
tions,  on the other.  Criteria  for an optimum  pace of adjustment  are  sorely 
needed.  Undoubtedly,  they would call for some cushioning  against an 
immediate  and abrupt  change;  but they would avoid postponing  adjust- 
ments  indefinitely  because  the cumulative  cost of making  them  would  rise 
the longer  they  are  postponed. 
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In a sense,  Solomon  is concerned  with  two different  types  of reallocation 
costs.  One  type  is the frictional  costs associated  with  both competitive  de- 
preciation  and the overshooting  of equilibrium  under flexible  rates. The 
second  is the cost of adjustment  over, say, a decade  from a situation of 
temporary  OECD  deficit  back  to the "normal"  situation  of surplus  with the 
rest  of the world.  The benefits  of avoiding  the first  kind of cost are  much 
more  evident  than  those  associated  with  minimizing  the second.  In the lat- 
ter case, the projected  shift is sufficiently  gradual and uncertain  that 
"optimum  plans"  are  likely  to go astray. 
Criteria  based  on the need  for real  adjustment  to changes  in the terms  of 
trade  tend  to conflict  with  those  based  on the capacity  to service  debts.  In 
an ideal  world,  where  the poorer  countries  were  faster-growing  as well as 
capital-scarce,  the poor nations  would  have a high marginal  efficiency  of 
capital  and should  be allocated  the lion's share  of the deficit.  In the real 
world,  however,  poor countries  are often least able to bear the burden  of 
substantial  debt.  I have  the uneasy  suspicion  that  some  current  discussions 
about  how  best  to achieve  so-called  secondary  recycling-getting  the  money 
back  to the  countries  that  need  it the  most-really concern  a different  issue: 
how to allocate  the burden  of assisting  those countries  for which  the real 
costs  of changed  terms  of trade  threaten  social  upheaval  or economic  col- 
lapse.  And that  becomes  a problem  of foreign  aid rather  than  recycling. 
While  those considerations  are most relevant  for less-developed  coun- 
tries,  they  may  apply  to some  degree  even  within  the  OECD.  I am reminded 
of Wilson  Schmidt's  paradox  that, in cases where  the return  on capital  is 
lower  in the receiving  country  than in the lending  country,  loans can turn 
out to be a more  expensive  form  of aid than  simple  outright  grants.  It may 
be that loans are an inefficient-if not impossible-way of handling  the 
present  problems. 
Another  perennial  issue  that arises  in this paper  is whether  governments 
can read  the future  better  than the marketplace  can. While Solomon  ap- 
parently  assumes  that  they  can (or will  insist  on trying),  I think  that  history 
should  make  us cautious  on this point.  The substantial  revisions  that  have 
been made over  just the past year in estimates  of the magnitude  of the 
deficit  problem  underline  the need for such caution.  Moreover,  with the 
passage  of time, it will become  increasingly  difficult  to identify  quantita- 
tively anybody's  "oil deficit" because that requires  determining  what 
would  have  happened  in the counterfactual  case of no major  price  increase 
for crude  petroleum. 82  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1975 
All in all,  I agree  with  Solomon  that  governments  seem  likely  to intervene 
in any  case,  and  that  much  can  be said  for coordinated  rather  than  uncoor- 
dinated  intervention.  I would  urge,  however,  that the search  for relatively 
simple  and  clear-cut  criteria  not be allowed  to impair  flexibility  in adapting 
targets  continually  to changing  economic  conditions. 
Walter  S. Salant:  Let me begin  by pointing  out, apropos  of Marina  Whit- 
man's  question  of whether  governments  have  better  foresight  than  the mar- 
ket, that Solomon's  central  argument  for some coordinated  allocation  of 
the aggregate  current-account  deficit  of oil importers  does not depend  on 
that premise.  Rather,  it rests  on the external  diseconomies  that would  re- 
sult  from  letting  nature  take  its course,  if that course  involved  beggar-thy- 
neighbor  policies.  The case  for laissez-faire  has been  set forth  by a number 
of articulate  U.S. Treasury  officials.  Indeed,  their  arguments  may deserve 
more thorough  discussion  and criticism  than Solomon gave them. Al- 
though  I am satisfied  with  most of his reasons  for rejecting  that approach, 
one reason  that does not satisfy  me is his conviction  that an appreciation 
of OPEC  currencies  would not enhance  their ability  to absorb  imports. 
I don't see why that ability  should  be impervious  to the price  of imports, 
especially  considering  that their imports include military  products  that 
appear  to be luxuries. 
Some who favor  the laissez-faire  approach  emphasize  that adjustments 
to large  international  transfers  in the past have  not been  very  difficult,  and 
cite instances  of easily  made  transfers,  going  back  to reparations  after  the 
Franco-Prussian  war. I believe  those examples  are poor analogies  since 
they involved  only two-or,  at most, a few-countries. Any single  paying 
country  can expand  its exports  by selling  more  to all other  countries  in the 
world,  not just to the payee.  Similarly,  a single  payee  can expand  its im- 
ports  not  just from  the payer  but from  all other  countries.  These  historical 
analogies  involving  transfers  between  two countries,  or at best among a 
handful  of countries,  cast  no light on the present  problem,  in which  many 
nations  with large  economies  are sizable  payers  who must make the real 
transfers  by increasing  exports  to a group  of payees  with  small  economies. 
They  imply  a solution  of the  problem  by ignoring  the  very  things  that  make 
it a problem. 
Assuming  that some allocation  of the aggregate  current-account  deficit 
should  be collectively  agreed  upon,  there  are  two approaches.  One  is politi- 
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stresses  that agreement  is needed  basically  to avoid beggar-thy-neighbor 
policies  and  consequently  emphasizes  the potential  for success  in achieving 
that  agreement.  At the extreme,  it implies  that anything  that the countries 
will agree  on is okay. The second  approach  may be called  the welfare  or 
efficiency  approach.  It relies  on more  or less traditional  criteria  of welfare 
economics  to set target  allocations  of current-account  deficits.  The welfare 
approach  is the game  that most of the participants  in this conference  can 
play.  For the political  approach,  most of us would  be technologically  un- 
employable.  So naturally  we dwell  on the welfare  aspects.  In any case, if 
several  allocations  are politically  about equally  acceptable,  welfare  con- 
siderations  can serve  as a rational  basis  for choosing  among  them.  Maybe 
that  is the  way  that  we,  as a group,  can  rationalize  our  concentration  on the 
only  game  we know  how to play,  instead  of on the one that may be more 
relevant  to the fundamental  objective. 
The welfare  approach,  as it actually  has been applied,  highlights  the 
differential  impact among countries  on present  versus future domestic 
absorption  of resources  associated  with  different  methods  of allocating  the 
deficit;  for a country  to accept  a large  deficit  is not regarded  as a cost but 
as avoidance  of a cost-that  of forgoing  or postponing  investment  or con- 
sumption.  I am not sure  why absorption  forgone  or postponed  should  be 
regarded  as a more relevant  or more fundamental  measure  of cost than 
loss or postponement  of real income,  which would include  not only ab- 
sorption  but  changes  in net financial  wealth.  Second,  the approach  focuses 
on the extent to which reallocations  of resources  are minimized  in the 
adjustment  period. Third, it raises the question  of the willingness  and 
ability  of various  OECD  members  to incur  incremental  debt.  And, fourth, 
it is concerned  with  the effect  of alternative  proposals  on the growth  rates 
of aggregate  real  income  in the OECD  area  as a whole.  I am not convinced 
that the growth  criterion  can be used without  taking  into account  differ- 
ential  impacts  among  nations. 
When  Solomon  turns  to specific  criteria  of allocation,  he refers  to the 
first  criterion  on his list as "ability  to reduce  absorption  of resources."  It is 
the ability  to shoulder  real transfers-to postpone  receiving  goods and 
services  in the face of an inevitable  cut in real income.  That, of course, 
points  in the direction  of deficits  allocated  in some inverse  relationship  to 
GNP per  capita.  Solomon  stresses  the difficulty  of allocating  incremental 
debts by this criterion.  Nonetheless,  if that is the pattern  the countries 
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The second criterion  Solomon considers  is the allocation  of current- 
account  deficits  in proportion  to economic  size. To the extent  that coun- 
tries  with  larger  GNPs  also  have  larger  GNPs  per  capita,  this  criterion  does 
require  greater  real  transfers  from  poor than from  rich  countries.  But the 
correlation  between  economic  size and income  per capita  is loose. There- 
fore, using  the total GNP is not necessarily  regressive  from the point of 
view of real  absorption. 
The third  criterion-allocating  the deficit  in proportion  to the marginal 
social  rate of return  on capital-suffers from the measurement  problems 
that Solomon  stresses.  But other  authors  have proposed  to approximate 
that  criterion  by allocating  the deficit  in proportion  to gross  investment  on 
the theory  that levels of investment  bear some rough  relation  to rates of 
return  on capital. 
Others  have argued  that, since the marginal  propensity  to save of the 
OPEC  members  is higher than that of the oil-importing  countries,  the 
focus  should  be on either  reducing  saving  or raising  investment  enough  to 
maintain  a world  equality  of the two at full employment.  This  offset  to the 
threatened  excess  of investment  over  saving  should  be distributed,  accord- 
ing to this  view,  in a way that equalizes  the marginal  productivities  of the 
incremental  investments.  That  does not prescribe  how much  of the adjust- 
ment  should  be made  in the form  of incremental  investment  and  how much 
in the form of incremental  consumption.  It seems  to me that the correct 
principle  would  be to distribute  both so as to equalize  the marginal  social 
utility  of additional  investment  and  additional  consumption. 
Many  of these  more  sophisticated  proposals  for allocation  would  require 
an aggregation  of the  social-welfare  functions  of importing  countries.  Since 
that  is not possible,  one is forced  to retreat  to something  fairly  simple,  like 
GNP  per  capita,  as a practical  criterion  that  would  yield  a result  not too far 
from  the implications  of the welfare  approach. 
General  Discussion 
A number  of participants  argued  that the case for laissez-faire  in the 
allocation  of deficits  was a good deal stronger  than was conceded  in the 
paper.  William  Branson  felt that Solomon  had not made  an overpowering 
case against  laissez-faire-reliance  on flexible  exchange  rates-to  accom- 
plish  the  adjustment.  Rather,  he had  launched  into his specific  criteria  for a Robert  Solomon  85 
coordinated  solution  by predicting  that governments  will take action- 
without  establishing  that they should  take action.  Alternatively,  in Bran- 
son's  judgment,  one could  approach  the whole  problem  by viewing  the oil 
deficit  as a particular  kind of problem  in balance-of-payments  adjustment 
in a world  in which  exchange  rates  are  not pegged.  Adjustment  by govern- 
ment-coordinated  capital  movements  can  be regarded  as a means  of moving 
back  into a fixed-rate  system. 
Salant  took issue  with  this interpretation,  and argued  that the oil deficit 
poses such a massive  problem  of adjustment  by such a large  part of the 
world  that  the difference  in size becomes  a difference  in kind.  In response, 
Branson  accepted  Salant's  view with respect  to the deficit  of the OECD 
countries  as a group:  that  deficit  may  be inevitable  and  incapable  of adjust- 
ment  for a time.  But he contrasted  that adjustment  with the one required 
within  the group of oil-importing  countries,  which conceivably  might be 
handled  by changes  in relative  exchange  rates  among  them  that held con- 
stant  their  average  exchange  rate  relative  to OPEC  currencies. 
William  Poole  suggested  that  the  controversy  between  advocates  of inter- 
vention  and of free exchange  rates  for handling  the oil deficit  provided  a 
specific  illustration  of the general  differences  among  economists  in apprais- 
ing the responsiveness  of economic  behavior  to price  and interest-rate  in- 
centives.  While  Solomon  had spelled  out the possibilities  for adverse  devel- 
opments  under  the regime  of free exchange  rates,  Poole saw comparable 
dangers  of adverse  developments  under  the interventionist  plan. It is not 
clear  that OECD governments  would accept  a consistent  plan. Nor is it 
clear  that their  intervention  could avoid restrictions  on trade  and capital 
movements,  nor that it would  promote  wage-price  stability,  nor avoid er- 
rors  of macroeconomic  policy,  nor minimize  temporary  resource  realloca- 
tion. 
Lawrence  Krause  pointed  to a different  kind of solution,  which  avoided 
any  collective  allocation  of the deficits  among  the OECD  nations.  Instead, 
it would permit  individual  governments  to influence  exchange  rates by 
official  borrowing.  Such a plan requires  only limited  collective  action to 
ensure  that  a country  can  borrow  the money  it needs  to cover  its oil deficit. 
Under  present  circumstances,  countries  may  want  deficits  but be unable  to 
borrow  sufficiently.  Hence,  Krause  felt that  the reshuffling  problem  is seri- 
ous and  may  be the most important  issue  to negotiate  and coordinate. 
Reacting  to these  criticisms  of the central  argument  in the paper,  Franco 
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lective allocation of the deficit to avoid competitive devaluation and un- 
necessary temporary shifts of resources. 
Modigliani expressed  his personal inclination toward some modified cri- 
terion of the oil deficit-the  additional cost of oil imports to the various 
OECD nations. He and Solomon engaged in a discussion of the sense in 
which the burden of  the  oil  deficit could be  deferred. Modigliani con- 
tended that whether the burden was borne now or deferred was not to be 
confused with whether the extra oil bill was paid with additional exports 
or by borrowing. A country could run a deficit and still be paying now if it 
curbed consumption in  recognition  of  its  lower real income  from  the 
worsened terms of trade and channeled the resources so released into in- 
creased domestic investment (rather than increased exports). It would in 
effect be paying with the additional investment, offsetting the debt incurred 
and providing the extra income for servicing and amortizing it.  If this 
mechanism were generally understood, there would  be  no  reason  for 
countries to  regard a  large current-account deficit as  a  burden to  be 
avoided, especially when the additional investments could be expected to 
yield domestic benefits beyond the debt service. On the contrary, a deficit 
should be seen as an opportunity as long as its financing was assured. Put 
differently, the fact that OPEC members are willing to save much of their 
gain should be seen and seized as an opportunity for the consuming na- 
tions as a whole to increase investment. 
Martin Feldstein noted that the outcome would not be very different if 
some of that new capital is owned by OPEC investors. Under the present 
tax systems of OECD countries, roughly half of the income on capital 
earned by OPEC would flow into  OECD  government revenues, largely 
through the corporate income tax. Thus, the OPEC drain on wealth may 
be smaller than it looks on the surface. 
Weir Brown saw the collective allocation as a formidable task in inter- 
national political economy. He reminded the group that governments in 
the OECD had attempted for some time to assure that developed coun- 
tries followed payments aims that were mutually compatible and that their 
aggregate current-account surplus vis-a-vis the less-developed world was 
consistent with the amount of aid received by LDCs. That endeavor had 
not been very successful. Moreover, in the present case, OPEC countries 
have a key influence on both capital flows and current payments, and they 
presumably will not be at the table negotiating the allocation in Solomon's 
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Arthur Okun noted that, in terms of the "welfare approach," the prob- 
lem facing OECD countries was a shortage of volunteers to incur debt and 
trade deficits. For a welfare-maximizing  solution, the group should subsi- 
dize that activity-for  example, by offering loans to volunteers at very low 
rates of interest. Moreover, any deficit assigned to a country as its quota 
under a collective agreement  ought to be viewed as its minimum obligation; 
any nation willing to incur an even larger deficit should be encouraged to 
do so. 
In responding  to various points raised in the discussion, Robert Solomon 
conceded to Salant that the price elasticity for total OPEC imports was 
very uncertain,  but said that it seemed quite low to him, impressionistically. 
He assured  Whitman that he had no conscious nostalgia for the old system 
of fixed exchange rates, even though he had less than complete faith in the 
capacity of freely flexible rates to handle the great strain of oil deficits. 
Finally, he  suggested to  Krause that  negotiation  and  coordination  of 
official borrowing might raise the same problems and be about as difficult 
to negotiate as allocation of the current-account deficit. 